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Abs t ract
The  propert y  r i ght s i ssue i s one  of  t he  mo s t   i m port ant  i nst i t ut i onal   di f f erences bet w een
devel oped/ devel opi ng  count r i es.    The  vi ol ati on  of  t he  propert y  r i ght s r esult s wi t h  r ent-
seeking.   In order to see if  the ext ent of rent- seeking di f f ers signi f i cantl y bet w een
devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es,  I   appl i ed a cross secti on and a t i me   seri es study
wi t h t he i nt enti on t o m easure rent- seeking.   I  f ound t hat  r ent- seeking i s low  i n
devel oped count r i es w hil st i t  i s high i n devel opi ng count erpart s.  Tur key,  as a
devel opi ng count r y w as m y special case to appl y t i me  s e r i es study t o see if  rent-
seeking vary over  t he years.    I n my   addi t i onal   wo r k f or  Tur key,   I   f ound t hat   t here i s a
coint egrati ng relati onshi p bet w een rent- seeking as a percentage of the budget  LnRt
and  governm ent   size (LnG Yt) ,   and  GNP  per  capit a i ncom e  (LnGNPCt) .
Ke y   Wo r d s :R e n t - Seeking,   Budget ary  Al l ocati on,   Cr oss Secti on  St udy  and  Ti me  
Ser i es St udy3
1. Introduct i on
I n order  t o appl y a m easurem ent  t echni que t o see i f   t he extent  of  r ent- seeking di f f ers
signi f i cantl y bet w een devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es,  i n t hi s paper,   I   f i r st  l ook at
propert y ri ght s issue in devel oped/ devel opi ng count r i es as one of t he i nst i t ut i onal
di f f erences,  t hen I   i nt end t o appl y a f ew  m easurem ent  t echni ques i n order  t o exam ine
t he i mp l i cati on t hat  rent- seeking act i vi t i es dif f er bet w een devel oped and devel opi ng
count r i es.    A ccordi ng t o Ka t z and Rosenberg ( 1989: 140),   “developed econom i es wi t h
establi shed hi erarchies t end t o be l ess wa s t eful   t han l ess devel oped econom i es,  wh i ch
are t ypi call y sti l l   t r yi ng t o f i nd t hei r   pol i t i cal  and social  i dent i t y by shif t s i n t he r elati ve
pow er  of  pressure groups”.
I n  t hei r   study,   Ka t z and  Rosenberg  presented quant i t ati ve  m easures of  r ent- seeking  f or
20 count r i es.  B y extendi ng K at z and R osenberg’s ti me  p e r i od,  wh i ch w as for the
peri od 1970-1985,   I   exam ine a cross secti on of  20 count r i es duri ng t he peri od 1974-
1994 t o see if  Ka t z and Rosenberg’s concl usi on i s robust .   In addi t i on,  I conduct  a
t i me   seri es study f or  Tur key duri ng t he peri od 1960-1994.     I n bot h studi es,  I   use Ka t z
and Rosenberg’s m easure of rent- seeking,  wh i ch captures w aste as a proport i on of
governm ent   spendi ng  f or  t he  governm ent ’ s budget ary  all ocati on.
Ka t z and Rosenberg (1989: 140) stated that ,  “str ong propert y ri ght s reduce rent-
seeking acti vi t i es”.    Ther efore,  I   di scuss propert y r i ght s very bri efl y i n t he next   secti on
before I   start   our  em pir i cal  analysi s,  since i t   i s one of  t he f undam ent al  i ssues i n ma n y
devel opi ng econom i es.  In part i cular,  thi s bri ef expl anati on of propert y ri ght s m ight
hel p  us  t o  understand  r ent- seeking  i n  a devel opi ng  count r y  l i ke  Tur key.
2. Property  Ri ghts and  Re nt - Seeking
M any devel opi ng count r i es are in a  vi cious ci r cle of low  l i vi ng st andards (l ow  per
capit a nati onal  incom e,  unequal  di str i but i on of nat i onal  incom e,  povert y,  poor healt h
and  educati on  opport uni t i es);   l ow   l evels of  product i vi t y;   hi gh  popul ati on  grow t h  r ates;4
hi gh unem pl oym ent ;  hi gh foreign debt s; underdevel oped i ndust r i es; hi gh dependency
on agri cult ure  etc. (Thi r wa l l ,  1991).   In addi t i on t o t hese com m on characteri sti cs,
devel opi ng count r i es also suff er because of w eak econom i c and pol i t i cal inst i t ut i ons;
such as unprot ected propert y ri ght s, absence of a consti t ut i onal  f r am ew ork and
undevel oped  governm ent   t hat   cannot   carr y  out   i t s f unct i ons  properl y.
I t   i s wi del y  accepted t hat   governm ent s,  i n  general,   pl ay an i m port ant  r ol e i n  sti mu l ati ng
econom i c acti vi t y by operati ng t hei r  f unct i ons appropri ately and eff ecti vel y. In
part i cular,  t he m ai n funct i ons of governm ent  i n bot h devel oped and devel opi ng
count r i es are expected t o  be;   ma i nt aini ng  publ i c servi ces,  i nfl uenci ng  att i t udes,   shaping
econom i c inst i t ut i ons,  infl uenci ng t he di str i but i on of incom e,  infl uenci ng t he use of
r esources, cont r ol l i ng t he quant i t y of m oney,  cont r ol l i ng econom i c fl uct uat i ons,
ensuri ng  f ul l   em ploym ent   and  i nfl uenci ng  t he  l evel  of  i nvest me n t   ( Lewi s,  1963).
Ther e i s no  doubt   t hat   we   all   need governm ent   t o  prot ect  us,   t o  secure our  r i ght s f r om
vi ol ati on and t o provi de publ i c goods t hat  cannot  be w el l  provi ded t hrough ordi nary
ma r ket  processes.  The abil i t y of governm ent s to use t hei r  m onopol y of legit i ma t e
f orces i s centr al  t o t he f ul f i l me n t   of  t hose t asks.    Ho we v e r ,   t hi s m onopol y pow er  ma y
be used for ot her purposes.   G overnm ent s m ay do t hi ngs for bad reasons that  are
essenti all y corr upt ,  e.g.  gi vi ng favours to t hei r  support ers.  Therefore, governm ent s
ma y   f ail  eit her because they do t oo l i t t l e, or because they do t oo m uch.   In m any
devel opi ng count r i es, the degree of econom i c pow er of governm ent s dom i nat es thei r
pol i t i cal pow er,  since they fi nd i t  di f f i cult y t o i solate the econom i c rol e of the st ate
f r om   i t s pol i t i cal,   social  and  mi l i t ary  r ol es.
I f  governm ent s do t he ri ght  thi ngs econom i c grow t h and pol i t i cal stabil i t y m i ght  be
achieved.    Ne v e r t hel ess,  i f   t hey do t oo l i t t l e or  t oo mu c h   or  t he wr ong t hi ngs,   grow t h
and st abil i t y are retarded.   For inst ance, prot ecti oni sm  in t r ade in m any devel opi ng
count r i es i s sti l l   seen as one of  t he ma i n f unct i ons of  a dom i nant   state
1.     Thi s poi nt   l ed
H ayek (1944) and m any ot her li beral econom i sts to argue t hat  an extension of state
1  Econom i call y,   pol i t i call y  and  sociall y  dom i nant   state.5
ow nership or  t he f orms   of  t he state i nvol vem ent   i n t he econom y necessari l y gave r i se
t o  a t ot ali t ari an,  r epressive  pol i t i cal  system .
I ndeed,  i n m any devel opi ng count r i es,  governm ent s f ail   t o ma i nt ain equali t y,   prom ot e
t he  expl oi t ati on  of  one  class by  anot her  and  negl ect  publ i c servi ces.    At   t he  sam e t i me ,
t hey m ay put  i n pl ace excessive cont r ol s (by regul ati ons) and end up w i t h over
spendi ng.     Mo r e i m port antl y,   r ather  t han  prot ecti ng  r i ght s f r om   vi ol ati on,   governm ent s
use t hei r  pow er as an inst r um ent  of vi ol ati on of propert y ri ght s as m uch of t he
l i t erature on rent- seeking not es.  A s it  is know n,  if  capit al forma t i on i s one of the
condi t i ons of econom i c grow t h,  t he exi stence of a law  of propert y i s one of t he
condi t i ons  of  capit al  f orma t i on.     Wi t h  t he  concept  of    propert y  I   m ean t he  l egal  r i ght   t o
exclude ot her peopl e fr om  usi ng a part i cular resource.  In order to secure propert y
r i ght s i t   i s necessary  f or  governm ent s t o  prot ect  publ i c propert y  f r om   pri vat e abuse  and
i t  i s necessary t o prot ect pri vat e propert y fr om  publ i c abuse and pri vat e abuse.
Ne v e r t hel ess, governm ent s in devel opi ng count r i es oft en use thei r  authori t y and t hei r
confi scatory pow er t o provi de pri vi l eges desir ed by part i cular pol i t i call y-i nfl uent i al
peopl e at  publ i c expense ( Tul l ock,  1993).   In ot her wo r ds,  if  governm ent s cannot  or
do not  wa n t  t o prot ect t he propert y ri ght s of t he publ i c for t he favour of som e
pri vi l eged groups,  rent- seeking i ncreases. A ccordi ng t o Tul l ock (1967),  undesi r able
r ent- seeking  occurs i n  t he  case of  unw i l l i ng  uncom pensat ed t r ansfers.  On   t he  sam e l i ne,
Mc Nu t t  (1996: 164) em phasi sed that  “w hen I i nt erpret rent- seeking act i vi t y as an
abri dgem ent  of propert y ri ght s, t hen t r adit i onal  r ent- seeking i s undesi r able if  t he
i ndi vi dual  or society i s inadequat ely com pensated for the t r ansfer of resources that
t akes pl ace”.    I f   t hese uncom pensat ed groups are i nvest ors w hose propert y r i ght s are
not   prot ected and w hose we l f are l osses are uncovered,  capit al  i s di scouraged and t hi s
deepens t he  vi cious  cir cle of  povert y  of  devel opi ng  count r i es.
Al t hough t hese unprot ected propert y ri ght s issues seem  to be m ai nl y a probl em  of
devel opi ng count r i es, it  actual l y aff ects bot h groups of count r i es but  to a di f f erent
degree.    I t   i s cert ainl y t r ue t hat   r ent- seeking i s everyw here,  but   at  di f f erent  l evels.    I n
t he publ i c choice approach, it  is consi dered that  a theory of propert y ri ght s is a very
i m port ant  i ssue and r equi r es a com plete t heory of  ‘ t he state’.     As   an extension of  t hi s6
i dea it  is also consi dered that  propert y ri ght s, the st ate str uct ure and rent- seeking
acti vi t i es are closel y i nt err elated wi t h each ot her.     For   t hi s r eason,  i n order  t o r educe
r ent- seeking, Tul l ock (1993) suggest s several pol i t i cal reforms  t hat  mi ght  i mp r ove
vi ol ated propert y  r i ght s.    These are;  qual i f i ed ma j ori t y  vot i ng,   greater  use  of  r eferenda,
a balanced budget ,  l i mi t s on t he si ze and the ext ent of governm ent ,  and bet t er
const i t ut i onal   enforcem ent.
I n  t he  l i ght   of  t he  propert y  r i ght s i ssue,  i n  secti on  I I I   I   undert ake a cross secti on  study
t o exam ine t he ext ent of rent- seeking i n bot h devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es. I
consi der  t hat   i f   r ent- seeking i s t he vi ol ati on of  propert y r i ght s,  i t   can be i nt eresti ng t o
associate and com pare r ent- seeking wi t h di f f erent  i nst i t ut i onal   sett i ngs i n cross secti on
study.   In order t o carr y out  t hi s analysi s I t ake changes in governm ent  budget
categori es as a proxy for rent- seeking.   Thi s is a m ethod suggest ed by K at z and
Rosenberg (1989).   O ur ma i n i nt enti on i s to com pare our result s w it h t hose of Ka t z
and Rosenberg t o see if  t here are any signi f i cant changes since thei r  study w as
publ i shed i n  1989.     Fi r st  I   need t o  expl ain  wh a t   Ka t z and  Rosenberg’s i dea i s,  how   t hey
m easurer ent- seeking  and  wh a t   are t he  ma i n  w eaknesses and  str engt hs  of  t he  approach.
3. R ent- Seeking  and  Budget ary  Al l ocati ons
Ka t z and Rosenberg ( 1989)  consi dered t hat   governm ent   t r ansfers generate wa s t e and
l ow er actual  nat i onal  i ncom e,  wh i l st not  necessari l y changi ng t he account i ng of
nat i onal   i ncom e
2 .S o  t hat  they off ered a m ethod t o m easure the w ast e due t o rent-
seeking wh i ch r esult s f r om  t he governm ent ’ s budget .     Thei r   r ent- seeking m easure wa s
t he proport i on of governm ent  spendi ng for t he governm ent ’ s budget ary al l ocati on
( i ncl udi ng t r ansfers).   A lt hough K at z and R osenberg’s im port ant com ponent  of the
m easurem ent w as governm ent  tr ansfers (wh i ch w as referr ed ori gi nal l y by Tul l ock i n
1967) they consi dered the em pl oym ent  of changes in governm ent  spending as bei ng
subj ect to ful l  di ssipat i on by rent- seeking,  rather than onl y changes i n governm ent
t ransfers.    Ka t z and Rosenberg str essed t hat   t hey mi ght   have overesti ma t ed t he r ent-
seeking wh e n   t he changes i n governm ent   spendi ng i s consi dered.    For   t hem ,   t he ma i n
2  I ndeed,  even t he  com posi t i on  of  account i ng  nat i onal   i ncom e  mi ght   r em ain  unchanged.7
r eason f or  t hat   wa s   t he unavai l abil i t y of  dat a on t he changes i n governm ent   t r ansfers.
By e mpl oyi ng t he governm ent  spendi ng,  they di vi ded t he budget  int o ni ne categori es
i ncl udi ng;  H ealt h,  De f ence, Educati on,  etc. and t ook t he changes i n each of the ni ne
categori es beaten peri od  ( t - 1)  and  ( t )   as a proxy  f or  r ent- seeking.     Wi t h  t hi s study,   t hey
i nt ended t o f i l l   t he gap i n t he area of  t he m acroeconom i c eff ects of  r ent- seeking,   since
m any st udi es have deal t  mo s t l y w i t h rent- seeking eff ects of mi croeconom i c
governm ent   i nt ervent i on  such as governm ent ’ s mi croeconom i c pol i cy or  r egul ati on.
Ka t z and  Rosenberg’s esti ma t es of  r ent- seeking  i nduced  by  t he  governm ent   budget ,   I r e
based on t w o assum pti ons. Fi rst,  t hey assum ed t hat  every i nt erperi od change i n
governm ent  budget  categori es ari ses fr om  rent- seeking act i vi t i es by special int erest
groups.     Ka t z and  Rosenberg  consi dered t hat   r ent- seeking  bat t l es t ake pl ace i n  order  t o
alt er  t he  str uct ure of  propert y  r i ght s over  t he  budget   at  t he  ma r gi n.     H ence,  any  change
i n t he proport i onal  com posi t i on of t ot al governm ent  spendi ng w as assum ed to be
i ndi cati ve  of  a wa s t e of  r esources r esult i ng  f r om   r ent- seeking.     Wi t h t hat   assum pti on i t
wa s   characteri sed t hat   t here i s a di r ect  connecti on exist  beaten t r ansfers i n t he budget
and t he rent- seeking act i vi t y.   This assum pti on vi ew s governm ent  spendi ng as sel f -
servi ng  by  t he  governm ent   r ather  t han  as an alt r ui sti c r esponse  t o  t he  needs of  publ i c.
Ka t z and  Rosenberg’s second assum pti on  wa s   t hat   t he  aggregate net   benefi t   f r om   t hi s
specialrent- seeking  i s zero,   i . e.  r esources are expended  unt i l   t he  ma r gi nal   benefi t   f r om
budget ary  all ocati ons  i s equal   t o  ma r gi nal   cost.     Thus,   t he  acti vi t i es of  special  i nt erests
groups i n pursuit  of rents are a pure w aste of nat i onal  resources.  T his poi nt  can be
expl ained bet t er wi t h an exam ple.  Kat z and Rosenberg consi dered an econom y
consi sti ng of three sectors; an agri cult ural sector,  an indust r i al sector and a servi ce
sector.I ni t i all y  i t  i s assum ed that  t here is no governm ent  i nt ervent i on i n t hi s
econom y.   Lat er,  i t  i s consi dered the case that  t he governm ent  i nt ervenes i n t he
econom y  by  t axing  peopl e,  w ho  em ployed  i n  t he  servi ce sector  and  announces  t hat   t hi s
coll ected tax wi l l   be  gi ven  eit her  agri cult ure or  i ndust r y.     U nder  t he  cir cum stances t hat
t here are no i ncom e and subst i t ut i on eff ects of those t axes and tr ansfers, it  can be
speculated t hat   eit her  agri cult ure sector  or  i ndust r i al  sector  ( but   not   bot h groups)  wi l l
obt ain t hese benefi t s (wh i ch are the t ax receipt s fr om  t he servi ce sector) .   From  t he8
r ent- seeking perspecti ve,  it  is obvi ous t o expect  that  bot h groups (agri cult ural sector
and i ndust r y sector)   wi l l   have an i ncenti ve t o l obby t he governm ent   i n t he att em pt  t o
di vert   t hese f unds t horough t hem sel ves.     Ka t z and Rosenberg c o mme n t ed on t hat   t he
am ount   t o be gi ven t o eit her  group i s equal   t o t he r ent- seeking acti vi t y,   wh i ch uses up
r esources but do not  increase the si ze of the nat i onal  pi e. In part i cular,  since these
governm ent  t r ansfers generate w aste, t hey l ow er actual  nat i onal  i ncom e,  but  not
necessari l y reduci ng t he account i ng of nat i onal  incom e.   T herefore, thi s rent- seeking
acti vi t y  i s consi dered as a social  cost  t o  t he  w hol e society.
I n t he next  secti on,  under t he l i ght  of t hese assum pti ons,  I  expl ain K at z and
Rosenberg’s t echni que  and  how   t hey  esti ma t ed t he  extend  of  r ent- seeking  wa s t e due  t o
cert ain  t ypes  of  governm ent   t r ansfers and  spendi ng.
3. 1. Kat z and  R osenberg’s M odel   and  Thei r Rent - Seeking  M easures
Ka t z and  Rosenberg  i nt ended  t o  capture t he  t ot al  change i n  t he  proport i onal   all ocati on
of governm ent  spendi ng for di f f erent purposes.   Since they assum ed t hat ;  (i )  rent-
seeking act i vi t y done by pressure groups w hi ch use up real resources in t hei r  rent-
seeking  ,   and  ( i i )   t he  t ot al  r ent- seeking  done  i s equal   t o  t he  t ot al  change i n  t he  budget ’ s
proport i onal   all ocati on  f or  di f f erent  purposes,   t hey  defi ne  a vari able R t j  as r ent- seeking
f or budget ary al l ocati on (as a proport i onal  of overall  governm ent  spendi ng).R t j i s
based upon absol ut e changes in t he proport i on al l ocated to di f f erent budget ary
categori es i n  year  ( t )   over  year  ( t - 1)  as f ol l ow s:
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wh e r eSti j ()   and S t i j () −1  are t he  proport i ons  of  t he  budget   goi ng  t o  purpose  i   i n  year
( t )   and ( t - 1)  r especti vel y,   n i s equal   t o t he num ber  of  categori es i n t he budget ,   and t he
di vi sion by 2 i s done t o avoi d doubl e count i ng,  j  i s the num ber of count r i es, j  =
1, 2, 3. . . , 20.     So  t hat  Rt j  i s one hal f   of  t he sum  of  t he sum  t ot al  of  t he absolut e changes9
i n  t he  proport i on  all ocated t o  di f f erent  budget ary  categori es i n  year  ( t )   over  year  ( t - 1).
I t   i s accepted t o l i e beaten 0< Rt j<1.     I n Ka t z and Rosenberg’s paper  t he val ue
3  of Rt j
i s calculated f or  each year  f or  t he  peri od  of  1970-1985  f or  20  count r i es by  di vi di ng  t he
budget  int o ni ne purposes i ncl udi ng;  De f ence, H ealt h,  Educati on   et c.,  and by usi ng
UN’ s G overnm ent al  Fi nanci al  St ati sti cs.    The  m ean val ues of Rt j over ti me  f or these
20  count r i es I r e calculated as f ol l ow :







wh e r e T  i s t he num ber  of  years and Rcj  can be vi ew ed as r epresenti ng t he m ean r ent-
seeking  i n  count r y  j .
A not her m easure of t he w ast e induced by rent- seeking i s denot ed by W cj,  wh i ch
depends on Rcj and governm ent  expendi t ure as a percentage of GNP,  (G/ GNP)  that
t he governm ent   expropri ates by i t s spendi ng.     Wh i l stRcj tell s us of the i neff i ciency in
governm ent   spendi ng i t   ma y   be of  l i t t l e consequence i f   t he governm ent   sector  i s sm all .
Thus,   t he m easurem ent  of W cj  i s i m port ant  i f   a j udgem ent   i s t o be ma d e   of  t he social
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wh e r eG Cj  i s t he m ean of  governm ent   expendi t ure and G NPcj  i s t he m ean of  nat i onal
i ncom e  i n  each count r y.     Ag a i n  i t   i s assum ed t hat   0< W cj<1.
3  Ac t ual l y,   t hey consi der  t hat   mo s t   r ent- seeking t akes pl ace bet w een sub-depart me n t s or  purposes.   So
t hat  these aggregated data are li kel y t o l ead to underesti ma t es of the am ount  of rent- seeking t aking
pl ace.10
Ou r  aim i s to repeat Ka t z and R osenberg’s study for the peri od 1974-1994 for the
sam e 20 count r i es usi ng t he sam e t echni que.     The  i ni t i al  year  of  our  analysi s i s 1974,
not   1970 as Ka t z and Rosenberg used.     Thi s i s because,  our  dat a sources are di f f erent
( our dat a are fr om  IMF ’ s G overnm ent al Fi nanci al St ati sti cs and thei r  dat a are fr om
UN’ s G overnm ent al  Fi nanci al  St ati sti cs).
3. 2. Em pi rical  Res ul t s:
I n  TABLE.   1,   Ka t z and  Rosenberg’s r esult s are gi ven i n t he t hi r d and f ourt h colum ns,
wh i l st D em ir bas’s fi ndi ngs are presented in t he fi f t h and si xt h col um ns i n order to
f acil i t ate com pari sons.   B oth Rcj and W cj,are m ult i pl i ed by 100 i n order to m easure
r ent- seeking,   i n  cents,  per  each dol l ar  spent  by  t he  governm ent .
TABLE  1E s t i ma t es of  Re nt - Seeking  i n  a  C ross-Secti on  of  Count ries




No Co unt ries Rcj. 100 W cj. 100 Rcj100 W cj. 100
1A u s t r ali a2 . 87 0. 81 4. 03 1. 24
2B e l gi um 2. 13 0. 73 2. 91 1. 48
3 C anada 2.61 0. 59 3. 26 0. 74
4F r ance 1.28 0. 51 2. 61 1. 10
5G e r ma n y 1 . 38 0. 20 2. 02 0. 61
6G r eece 5.28 1. 25 6. 58 1. 15
7I t aly7 . 31 2. 65 5. 55 2. 26
8S p a i n2 . 92 0. 66 5. 23 1. 76
9S w e d e n 2 . 59 0. 92 3. 26 1. 49
10 Sw i t zerl and 2.10 1. 77 0. 17
11 U K 2. 55 0. 89 3. 12 1. 21
12 U SA 2. 80 0. 62 2. 40 0. 57
13 Chi l e5 . 32 1. 99 10. 22 2. 33
14 Egypt 10. 19 5. 19 8. 22 3. 49
15 Indonesi a7 . 85 1. 80 6. 47 1. 72
16 Israel 7.58 5. 43 9. 51 4. 63
17 K enya 3. 97 0. 99 5. 48 4. 48
18 K orea 6.08 0. 99 4. 51 0. 66
19 M exi co 10. 16 1. 75 11. 10 2. 55
20 Turkey 7. 70 1. 78 9. 73 1. 86
wh e r e;
Rcj  :T h e   m ean val ue  of R t  over  t i me   ( x100  t o  f i nd  t he  r ent- seeking  wa s t e,  i n
cents,  per  dol l ar  spent  by  t he  governm ent ) .12
W cj:A   m easure of  t he  wa s t e i nduced  by  r ent- seeking  f or  budget ary 
all ocati on  as a percentage of  GNP  ( x100  t o  f i nd  t he  r ent- seeking  wa s t e,
i n  cents,  per  dol l ar  spent  by  t he  governm ent ) .
As   can be  seen f r om   TABLE  2,   aft er  I   alt ered t he  peri od  and  extended  i t   f r om   15  years
t o 21 years,  I   r anked bot h De mi r bas r esult s and Ka t z and Rosenberg r esult s t o see i f
t here are signi f i cant di f f erences.  D espit e few  m ajor changes I found out  that  ma n y
count r i es m oved onl y one or  t wo   steps,  but   stayed i n t hei r   devel opi ng and devel oped
econom i es groups.   For exam ple, Ko r ea w as in t he 12t h pl ace in ranki ng by W cj i n
Ka t z and R osenberg’s study,  Ho we v e r ,  Ko r ea cli mb e d  t he 4t h pl ace in D em i r bas’s
study.     I t   m eans t hat   i n  Ko r ea,  r ent- seeking wa s   subj ect  t o a r educt i on t hat   i s achieved
eit her  by r educi ng t he r ent- seeking wa s t e as a proport i on of  GNP  or  by r educi ng t he
governm ent   share i n  GNP.     On   t he  ot her  hand,   Spai n  as a devel oped  econom y  dropped
f r om  6t h pl ace to 13t h pl ace.  I t  m eans that  r ent- seeking act i vi t i es increased
subst anti all y  aft er  1985  i n  Spai n  up  t o  1994.
I n addi t i on,   Tur ki sh budget ary r ent- seeking show ed a r educt i on i n De mi r bas study.     I t
wa s   on t he 15t h pl ace i n r anki ng by W cj Ka t z and Rosenberg study,   t hen i t   cli mb e d   t o
14t h pl ace i n De mi r bas’s r esult .     Al t hough i t   i s not   a subst anti al  r educt i on,   i t   sti l l   can
be  i nt erpreted as an i mp r ovem ent .
I   can also see t he di sti nct i on beaten devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es of  De mi r bas
study  i n  FI GURE  3.
TABLE  2 Rank  C orrelati on  Be t w een D em irbas and  Ka t z - R osenberg Re s ul t s
DEM I RBAS:
1974-1994
KATZ  &  ROSENBERG:
1970-1985




Swi t zerl and 1 1 Sw it zerl and 3 1
USA 3 2 Ge r ma n y 2 2
Ge r ma n y 2 3 F r ance 1 3
Ko r ea 10 4 C anada 7 4
Canada 7 5 USA 8 5
Fr ance 4 6 Spain1 06
Gr eece 15 7 B elgi um 4 7
UK 6 8 Aus t r ali a9 8
Au s t r ali a9 9 U K 5 9
Be l gi um 5 10 Sw eden 6 10
Sw eden 8 11 K enya 11 11
I ndonesi a1 4 1 2 K o r ea 14 12
Spai n1 1 1 3 G r eece 12 13
Tur key 18 14 M exi co 19 14
Chi l e1 9 1 5 T u r key 17 15
Me x i co 20 16 Indonesi a1 8 1 6
I t aly1 3 1 7C h i l e1 31 7
Egypt 16 18 It aly1 5 1 8
K enya 12 19 Egypt 20 19
I srael 17 20 Israel 16 20
FI GURE  3 R el ati on Betw een Re nt - Seeking  and  GNP  per capit a  Incom e f or 
t he  period  1974-1994.14
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Ther elati on ofRcj to t he l evel of devel opm ent  proxi es by G N PC i s il l ust r ated by t he
scatt er  di agram  i n  FI GURE  3.     I t   can be  seen t hat   devel opi ng  and  devel oped  count r i es
di sti nct i on st i l l  exists am ong count r i es (wi t h hi gh G N P per capit a and relati vel y l ow
r ent- seeking for devel oped count r i es, and w i t h l ow  G N P per capit a and hi gh rent-
seeking for devel opi ng count r i es).   C learl y,  it  can be com m ented on t hat  devel oped
count r i es l i ke  UK  wi t h  f i xed  pow er  str uct ures show s  l ess evidence  of  wa s t e t han  ma n y
devel opi ng count r i es, l i ke Turkey.   A s al so can be seen, t here is a tendency for
devel opi ng count r i es to congregate in t he upper left  hand si de of the scatt er di agram
and  f or  devel oped  count r i es t o  on  t he  l ow er  r i ght   hand  side.15
I n order  t o em phasi se t hi s di f f erence bet t er  I   carr i ed out   a simp l e analysi s.    By  t aking
average rent- seeking and st andard devi ati ons of De mi r bas’s study,  I int end t o show
how  w ast e is com parati vel y hi gher in devel opi ng count r i es. If  I classif y devel oped
count r i es as; Au s t r ali a, Canada,  Be l gi um ,  Fr ance G erm any,  Spai n,  I t aly,  Sw eden,
Swi t zerl and,  UK a n d  USA,  and devel opi ng count r i es as; Chi l e, Egypt ,  Indonesi a,
I srael,   K enya,   Ko r ea,  Me x i co,  Gr eece and  Tur key,   I   can get   t hese  r esult s:
TABLE.   4. A verage  Re nt - Seeking  and  St andard  De v i ati on  of  De mi rbas’s
St udy
Count ries A verage  Re nt - seeking St andard  De v i ati on
Rcj W cj Rcj W cj
De v e l oped  Count ries 2. 73 0. 89 0. 84 0. 48
De v e l opi ng  Count ries 7. 71 2. 46 2. 34 1. 34
I  can apply a t est stati sti c to see if  the m ean val ue for devel opi ng count r i es is reall y
hi gher  t han  devel oped  count r i es’  m ean val ue  or  not .
I  can test our nul l  hypot heses that  the m ean of popul ati on of devel opi ng count r i es is
equal  to t he m ean of popul ati on of devel oped count r i es or sm all er than t he m ean of
popul ati on of devel opi ng count r i es.  To conduct  t he t est,  I  select a sam ple for
devel oped count r i es as 12 and f or  devel opi ng count r i es as 8.     Wh e n   our  sam ple sizes
are sm all   ( l ess t han  30)  and  I   assum e bot h  popul ati ons  are norma l l y  di str i but ed,  t he  t est
stati sti c has  approxi ma t ely  a t   di str i but i on  wi t h  t he  degrees of  f r eedom .
Si nce the m ean val ue for devel oped count r i es,m DC ,i s 2.73 and t he m ean val ue for
devel opi ng count r i es, LDC m ,  i s 7.71;  and t he st andard devi ati on for devel oped
count r i es,d DC ,   i s 0. 84 and t he standard devi ati on f or  devel opi ng count r i es,d LDC ,   i s
2. 34,   t he  t est  stati sti c val ue  can be  calculated as 4. 49.
Thi s val ue i s a r eali sati on of  r andom  vari able approxi ma t ely f ol l ow i ng a t - di str i but i on
wi t h  degree of  f r eedom   i s 8. 24.16
I   r ound  dow nw ard  f r om   8. 24  and  use  t he  approxi ma t i on  df  =  8.     The  cri t i cal  poi nt   i n  a
one-t ail ed t est  wi t h a   =  0. 05  f or  a t - di str i but i on  wi t h  df  =  5  i s 1. 86.     Then,   I   r eject  t he
nul l  hypot hesi s that  the m ean val ues of tw o popul ati ons are equal to each other.   In
ot her wo r ds t he m ean val ue for devel opi ng count r i es is greater than for devel oped
count r i es.
3. 2. 1. Two  C ross Secti on  St udi es f or  20  Count ries
Fol l ow i ng Ka t z and Rosenberg’s argum ent ,   I   also appl y very simp l e analysi s i n order
t o exam ine r ent- seeking i n bot h devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es.    Ou r   i nt enti on i s
t o see if  there is any relati onshi p beat en quant i t ati ve m easures of the ‘proneness’ of
di f f erent count r i es to respond t o pressure groups i n det ermi ni ng t he com posi t i on of
t hei r  spendi ng and t hei r  GNPC.   A lt hough t hese m easures are onl y i ndi cati ve rather
t han concl usi ve,  I bel i eve that  they provi de som e m eans of com pari ng t he ext ent of
r ent- seeking across count r i es.  The hypot hesi s is that  the hi gher nat i onal  per capit a
i ncom e (as a proxy t o devel opm ent  level)  the l ess rent- seeking w i l l  occur.   It  m eans
t hat  opt i ma l  governm ent  t r ansfers, bet t er i nst i t ut i onal  devel opm ent ,  we l l  prot ected
propert yr i ght s     etc.  r educe r ent- seeking  acti vi t i es.    To  t est  t he  hypot hesi s I   used  Ka t z
and Rosenberg’s i dea f or  20 count r i es,  but   t hi s t i me   f or  t he peri od 1974-1994.     To  do
t hat ,   I   esti ma t e a r egression equat i on of  wa s t e as a percentage of  t he budget   (Rc)   on
t he  GNP  per  capit a ( GNPC c)   f or  20  count r i es.    Thi s r egression  t akes t he  f orm:
RG N P C cj cj cj =+ + ab e ( 4)
a) Kat z and  R osenberg’s cross secti on  result s ( 1989)  f or  20  count ries f or  t he 
peri od  1970-198517
Ka t z and Rosenberg est i ma t ed thi s li near regression of wa s t e as a percentage of the
budget   (Rcj)   on GNP  per  capit a (G NPC cj)   f or  20 count r i es and t hei r   r esult   yi elded as
f ol l ow i ng:
$ ..
(.) ( .) RG N P C cj cj =− 765 044
11 24 5 35
R
2 061 = . ( 5)
The val ues i n parentheses are t- val ues.  They f ound t hat  one uni t  an increase in
GNPCcj leads to a 0. 44 uni t  decrease in rent- seeking.   T he sign i s as expected and
coeff i cients are stati sti call y  signi f i cant.
b ) De mi rbas’s cross secti on  result s f or  20  count ries f or  t he  peri od  1974-1994:
Thi s l i near  r egression of  wa s t e as a percentage of  t he budget   (Rcj)   on GNP  per  capit a
(G NPC cj)   f or  20  count r i es yi elded  t he  f ol l ow i ng  r esult   i n  our  esti ma t i on:
$ ..
(. ) ( . ) RG N P C cj cj =−
− 822 031
88 8 37 6
R
2 044 = . ( 6)
The val ues i n parentheses are t- val ues.   I fi nd t hat  one uni t  an increase inG N P C cj
l eads t o  a 0. 31  uni t   decrease i n  r ent- seeking  wa s t e as a percentage of  t he  budget .   I   can
see thi s relati on i n equat i on (9) f or bot h devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es in
FI GURE  5.     Di am ond  dot s are f or  actual   val ues,   square dot s are f or  predicted val ues.
FI GURE  5R e l ati onshi p  bet w een R cj  and GNPCcj  f or  20  count ries i n 
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I   now  carr y out   a signi f i cance t est  on t he slope param etersb,   on equat i on ( 5),   and on
equat i on ( 6),   i n order  t o see i f   m eans are signi f i cantl y di f f erent  or  not   at  5% .     Ou r   nul l
hypot hesi s is that  m eans values for each equati on are the sam e and our alt ernat i ve
equat i on i s t hat   t hey are signi f i cantl y di f f erent.     For   t hese hypot hesi s,  since t he sam ple
size i s sm all   ( n  =  20)  t he  t est  stati sti c val ue  i s used  and  i t   wi l l   be  - 5. 21.
Si nce x 5 i s- 0. 44 and x 6 i s - 0. 31,   and standard err ors are calculated as 0. 08 f or  each
equat i ons,  the com put ed value of the t est stati sti c is t= −521 . ,  wh i ch is sm all er than
t he cri t i cal val ue -1. 73 i n a t wo - t ail ed test wi t h a =0 . 05 f or a t- di str i but i on.
Ther efore, I reject t he nul l  hypot hesi s that  m ean values for equat i on (5) and for
equat i on  ( 6)  are signi f i cantl y  di f f erent.
Wh e n   I   esti ma t e t he sam e r egression equat i on f or  devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es
separately,   I   obt ain:
*F o r d e v e l oped  count ries ( 1974-1994).19
$ ..
(. ) ( . ) RG N P C cj cj =−
− 929 042
38 8 21 7 ( 7)
R
2  =  0. 62,  R
2  =  0. 55
Va l ues  i n  parenthesi s are t - val ues.   At   5  %  signi f i cance l evel  t he  cri t i cal  t - val ue  i s -   2. 23
I  concl ude t hat  I  cannot  r eject t he nul l  hypot hesi s that  t here is no signi f i cant
r elati onshi p beat en the vari ables at 5 %  si gni f i cance level,  but  there is a signi f i cant
r elati on  at  10  %  signi f i cance l evel.     The  sign  of  coeff i cient  i s as expected.
*F o r d e v e l opi ng  count ries ( 1974-1994). ;
$ ..
(. ) (. ) RG N P C cj cj =+ 710 069
46 5 12 7 ( 8)
R
2  =  0. 61,  R
2  =  0. 58
The  val ues  i n  parenthesi s are t - val ues.     At   t he  5%   signi f i cance l evel  t he  cri t i cal  t -   val ue
i s 2. 09.     So  I   cannot   r eject  nul l   hypot hesi s t hat   t here i s no  r elati onshi p  beaten vari ables.
Ther e i s a no  signi f i cant  r elati on  even at  10  %  signi f i cance l evel
A s can be seen fr om  our analysi s, alt hough I found out  that  there is a signi f i cant
r elati onshi p beat en rent- seeking and G N P per capit a for 20 count r i es, t he sam e
r egression equat i on di d not  gi ve t he sam e answ er wh e n  I  separated count r i es int o
devel oped  and  devel opi ng  ones.
I   now  carr y out   a signi f i cance t est  on t he slope param eters i n equat i on ( 7)  ( wh i ch i s -
0. 42),   and  equat i on  ( 8)  ( wh i ch i s 0. 69)  i n  order  t o  see i f   t hey  are signi f i cantl y  di f f erent.
Ou r   nul l   hypot hesi s i s t hat   t here i s no  signi f i cant  r elati onshi p.
For   t hese hypot hesi s,  since t he sam ple size i s sm all   ( n =  20)  t he t est  stati sti c val ue wi l l
be  - 1. 94.20
Si nce x 7 i s- 0. 42 and x 8 i s 0. 69,   and standard err ors are calculated as 0. 08 f or  each
equat i ons,   t he  com put ed val ue  of  t he  t est  stati sti c i s t   =  - 1. 94,   wh i ch i s sm all er  t han  t he
cri t i cal  poi nt s - 1. 73  i n  a t wo - t ail ed t est  wi t h a =0 . 05  f or  a t - di str i but i on.     Ther efore,
I   r eject  t he nul l   hypot hesi s.    I n ot her  wo r ds,   t he m ean val ues f or  equat i on ( 7)  and f or
equat i on  ( 8)  are signi f i cantl y  di f f erent.
Ther efore, I concl ude t hat  cross secti on st udi es m ight  not  be t he best  me t hod for
m easuri ng rent- seeking w hen devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es’ di sti nct i on i s the
case in consi derati on.   In order to el i mi nat e these short com ings of the cross secti on
study,   I   appl y t i me   seri es study f or  Tur key wi t h mo r e expl anatory vari ables.    I n order
t o appl y a t i me   seri es t echni que I   need t o expl ain very bri efl y t he me t hodol ogy of  t hi s
study.
4. A   Ti me   Series St udy  For  T urkey
I n t he previous sect i on,  I appl i ed cross secti on analysi s for testi ng budget ary rent-
seeking f or  20 count r i es and concl uded t hat   budget ary r ent- seeking wi l l   decrease wi t h
an i ncrease i n t he l evel  of  devel opm ent   as proxi es by GNP  Per   Ca pi t a.    I n addi t i on,   I
also f ound t hat   Tur ki sh r ent- seeking f or  budget ary all ocati on as a percentage of  GNP,
W cj,  decreased and it  m oved t o 14t h pl ace fr om  15t h pl ace in D em i r bas’s Ranki ng
Cor r elati on Tabl e, (TABLE . 2).   I consi der that  alt hough cross secti on analysi s give
som e int eresti ng result s, it  sti l l  far fr om  bei ng very com prehensive and anal yt i cal.   In
t he analysi s, all  20 count r i es are assum ed to have si mi l ar pol i t i cal system s even in
devel opi ng and devel oped econom i es disti nct i on i s m enti oned.   Indeed, each count r y
has di f f erent i nst i t ut i onal  background and st r uct ure.  Si nce dif f erent i nst i t ut i onal
sett i ngs l ead t o di f f erent  l evels of  r ent- seeking,   t he actual   consequences of  changes i n
t he  di screti onary  pow er  of  pol i t i cal  agents can be  exam ined  i n  t i me - seri es approach.    I n
order  t o exam ine i nst i t ut i onal   i ssue i n Tur key i n t he cont ext  of  r ent- seeking,   I   appl i ed
t i me   seri es study.     Ther efore,  I   wi l l   exam ine  t he  hypot heses t hat   i f   t here i s any  l ong-r un
r elati onshi p bet w een vari ables in coi nt egrati on/ Er r or Cor r ecti on M echanism
f r am ew ork.21
4. 1. Coi nt egrati on  Test s
The concept of coint egrati on w as fi r st int r oduced i nt o t he l i t erature by G ranger in
1981. Coi nt egrati on i s the st ati sti cal i mp l i cati on of t he exi stence of a long-r un
r elati onshi p bet w een econom i c vari ables (Thom as,  1993).  The mai n i dea behi nd
coint egrati on  i s t hat   i f ,   i n  t he  l ong-r un,   t wo   or  mo r e seri es m ove  closel y  t oget her,   even
t hough  t he  seri es t hem sel ves  are t r ended,   t he  di f f erence bet w een t hem   i s const ant.     I t   i s
possibl e to regard t hese seri es as defi ni ng a l ong-r un equi l i bri um  relati onshi p,  as the
di f f erence bet w een t hem   i s stati onary  ( Ha l l   and  He n r y,   1989).
Cha r em za and  D eadm an ( 1992:   144)  defi ned  coint egrati on  as:
Ti me   seri es x t  and y t  are said t o be coint egrated of  order  d,   b wh e r e db ≥≥ 0,   wr i t t en
as;
xy tt , ~CI ( d, b),
i f :
1.bot h  seri es are i nt egrated
4  of  order  d,
2.t here exists a l i near  com binat i on  of  t hese  vari ables,  say a 1x t+a 2y t,   wh i ch i s i nt egrated
of  order  d-b
A ccordi ng t o t hi s defi ni t i on,  [aa 12 ,]  is call ed a coint egrati ng vect or.C o i nt egrati ng
coeff i cients, wh i ch consti t ut e the coi nt egrati ng vect or,  can be ident i f i ed w it h
param eters in t he l ong-r un relati onshi p bet w een the vari ables.  I n t he case of
coint egrati on,  if  these vari ables are coint egrated, they cannot  m ove ‘t oo far’  aw ay
f r om   each ot her.     I n  cont r ast,   a l ack of  coint egrati on suggest s t hat   such vari ables have
no  l ong-r un  r elati onshi p  ( Di ckey et.   al,   1991).
The or der of i nt egrati on of t he vari ables is one very i m port ant t opi c related to
coint egrati on.   I n t he l i t erature, mu c h  o f  t he t heory of coint egrati on has been
devel oped for the case w here all  seri es are int egrated of order one,  i. e. are I( 1).I t
mu s t  be st r essed that  if  vari ables in a l ong run relati onshi p are of di f f erent orders of
i nt egrati on and t he order of i nt egrati on of a dependent  vari able is low er t han t he
hi ghest  order of int egrati on of the expl anatory vari ables, there m ust be at  least two
4  I nt egrati on  i s t he  r epresentati on  of  a process as a sum  of  past   shocks.     A  process i s said  t o  be
i nt egrated of  order  d  ( ( I ( d))   i f   aft er  di f f erencing  d  t i me s   t he  r esult i ng  process i s stati onary  ( denot ed
I ( 0))22
expl anatory vari ables int egrated of thi s highest  order if  the necessary condi t i ons for
stati onary  of  t he  err or  t erm  i s t o  be  me t .
Ther e are three noti ons behi nd coi nt egrati on t o be m ent i oned here; spuri ous
corr elati on,   stati onary
5  t i me   seri es and err or  corr ecti on m odel l i ng ( ECM ) .     A ccordi ng
t o Gr anger  and Ne wb o l d ( 1974),   spuri ous r egressions are t ypi call y characteri sed by a
very  l ow   Du r bi n-Wa t son  stati sti c
6.     I f   t here i s a hi gh  degree of  corr elati on  bet w een t wo
vari ables,  i t   does  not   autom at i call y  i mp l y  t he  existence of  a casual  r elati onshi p  bet w een
t he vari ables concerned (Ho l den and Thom son,  1992).   For exam ple, a high R
2ma y
onl y  i ndi catec or r elated t r ends  and  a not   t r ue  econom i c r elati onshi p  ( Mi l l er,   1991).     To
r em edy thi s probl em , the coi nt egrati on t echni que and err or corr ecti on m odel l i ng are
r ecom m ended  ( Ba hma ni - O skooee  and  Al se,  1993).
Coi nt egrati on analysi s confr ont s spuri ous r egression,   att em pti ng t o i dent i f y condi t i ons
under wh i ch the regression relati onshi p i s not  spuri ous.   Therefore, the probl em  of
spuri ous regression,  and t he result i ng w ork on coi nt egrati on,  occurs because m ost
econom i c t i me   seri es are non-stati onary.     A  stochast i c process i s said t o be stati onary,
i f   t he  m ean,  vari ance and  covari ance of  a seri es t o  r em ain  const ant  over  t i me .     I f   one  or
mo r e of the condi t i ons are not  sati sfi ed, the process is nonst ati onary (Cha r em za and
D eadm an, 1992;  Thom as,  1993).C o i nt egrati on and err or corr ecti on m odel l i ng
i nvol ves m ai n t hree steps. F irst,  det ermi ne t he orders of int egrati on for each of the
vari ables; that  is, di f f erence each seri es successivel y unt i l  stati onary seri es em erge.
Second, att em pt t o est i ma t e coint egrati on regressions w i t h ordi nary l east squares,
usi ng  vari ables wi t h  t he  sam e order  of  i nt egrati on  ( i n  t he  t wo   vari able case).Fi nal l y,   i f
t here is a coint egrati ng relati onshi p bet w een the vari ables, const r uct  t he err or
corr ecti on  m odel .
4. 1. 1U n i t   Root   Test   f or  Or d e r   of   I nt egrati on
5 St ati onari t y  of  a seri es i mp l i es t hat   graphs  of  a r eali sati on  of  a t i me   seri es over  t wo   equal - l engt h  t i me
i nt erval s shoul d  exhi bi t   simi l ar  stati sti cal  characteri sti cs.    St ati onary  seri es have  a t endency  t o  r eturn
t o  t hei r   ori gi nal   val ue  aft er  a r andom   shock;   t he  m ean and  t he  vari ance of  such a seri es do  not   change
wi t h  t he  passage  of    t i me .
6  “Spuri ous  r egression  probl em s ma y   exist  wh e n   t he  adjust ed R
2 i s hi gher  t han  t he  DW   stati sti c;
under  such cir cum stances t he  coeff i cient  esti ma t es are probl em ati c”(Mi l l er,   1988: 31-32)23
Si nce standard r egression analysi s r equi r es t hat   dat a seri es be stati onary,   t he f i r st  step
i s t o i dent i f y t he order  of  i nt egrati on of  each of  t he vari ables.    Ther efore,  I   appl y t he
uni t   r oot   t est.     Al t hough t here are several  t ests f or  t he presence of  uni t   r oot s i n t i me
seri es dat a,  t he  standard  t esti ng  procedure f or  det ermi ni ng  t he  order  of  i nt egrati on  of  a
t i me  s e r i es is the A ugm ent ed D ickey-Ful l er (ADF)  t est (Di ckey and Full er,  1979,
1981).     The  general  f orm  of  ADF  t est  i n  l evels and  i n  f i r st  di f f erences can be  wr i t t en as
f ol l ow s;
∆∆ yy y T TT i
i
m
Ti T =+ + + + −
=
− ∑ ad b j e 1
1
( f or  l evels)        ( 9)
∆∆ ∆ ∆∆ yy y T TT i
i
m
Ti T =+ + + + −
=
− ∑ ad b j e 1
1
      ( f or  f i r st  di f f erences     ( 10)
wh e r e ,  ∆ytare t he  f i r st  di f f erences of  t he  seri es,  m  i s t he  num ber  of  l ags and  t   i s t i me .
I  r egress  ∆yt on a const ant,  y t −1, ∆yti −  ( several l ags of ∆yt( enough t o avoi d
autocorr elated disturbances))  and T (a ti me  t r end).   Then t he t - stati sti c on t he
esti ma t ed coeff i cient  of  d  i s used  t o  t est  t he  f ol l ow i ng  nul l   and  alt ernat i ve  hypot heses.
I n t he ADF  t est,   “the nul l   hypot hesi s i s t hat   t he vari able under  i nvest i gat i on has a uni t
r oot ,  against  the al t ernat i ve t hat  has not .   The subst anti all y negat i ve val ues of the
r eport ed t est  stati sti c l ead t o  r ejecti on  of  t he  nul l   hypot hesi s” ( Di ckey et  al. ,   1991: 72).
H o: d = 0 ( i . e.  t he  presence of  a uni t   r oot   i n  t he  seri es l evels)  ( 11. )
H 1 0 : d <
My  a i m i s to t est the nul l   hypot hesi s of noncoi nt egrati on against  the al t ernat i ve of
coint egrati on and t hen t o est i ma t e the coi nt egrati ng regression.   If  the hypot heses of
t he presence of  a uni t   r oot   I r e not   r ejected one w oul d t hen t he t est  t he di f f erences f or
t he presence of a second uni t  root .   If  the uni t  root  is set out  as above cannot  be
r ejected t hen yt  cannot   be  stati onary  and  i t   ma y   be  I ( 1)  or  I ( 2),   or  have  an even hi gher24
order of int egrati on [see for mo r e detail s, Fuel l er (1976);  Engl e and Y oo (1987),
Che r am za and  D eadm an ( 1997)] .
Si nce I   do not   know  t he t r ue order  of  d,   wh e n   I   used   t wo - step procedure,  t he m odel
selecti on cri t eri a such as the A kai ke Informa t i on Cri t eri a (AI C)  or t he Schw arz
Ba ye s i an Cr i t eri a ( SCB)   can be  used  t o  select  t he  order  of  t he  ADF  r egression.     To  do
t hat   I   select  t hree l ags,  t hen  choose  t he  hi ghest   AI C  t o  decide  wh i ch l ag I   wi l l   appl y.
The  r ejecti on of  t he no-coint egrati on hypot hesi s show s t hat   t he proposed r elati onshi p
i s a vali d coi nt egrati ng vect or wh i ch m akes the regression of budget ary rent- seeking
on t he vari ables  are non-spuri ous.   E xistence of coint egrati on m eans t hat  budget ary
r ent- seeking and t he ot her vari ables tend t o m ove t oget her.   Foll ow i ng t he recent
l i t erature the l i nk bet w een coint egrati on and t he err or corr ecti on are explored by t he
t wo   step procedure ( Engl e and Gr anger  ( 1987).     The  f i r st  stage i s simp l y t o esti ma t e
t he  stati c coint egrati ng  ( OLS)   r egression,   t he  second  i s t o  esti ma t e t he  err or  corr ecti on
m odel .     The  equat i on  t o  be  esti ma t ed i s as f ol l ow ;
4. 2. Ti me   series study  f or  Turkey wi t h  Addi t i onal   Var i abl es ( 1960-1994)
I  analyse Turkey si nce it  i s very i nt eresti ng count r y fr om  t he vi ew poi nt  of t he
i nst i t ut i ons.   The s t ate can be classif i ed as a ‘str ong st ate’,  wh i ch are “those
simu l t aneously  capable of  r esisti ng  pressures and  generati ng  publ i c pol i cy i ni t i ati ves  on
t hei r   ow n” ( Caporaso and Levi ne,   1993: 183).     On   t he ot her  hand,   t he i nt erest  groups
are w eak and unorgani sed.  In t he case that  the st ate is str ong,  the budget  wi l l  also
r epresent  t he  pol i cy i ni t i ati ves  of  t he  state ( t he  civi l   and  mi l i t ary  bureaucrats).
I n t hi s secti on,   i n order  t o analyse Tur ki sh case i n mo r e det ail ,   I   carr y out   t i me   seri es
analysi s i n  wh i ch governm ent   size and  f ew  d u mmy   vari ables are added  t o  t he  equat i on.
My   hypot hesi s i s t hat   t he  sm all er  t he  governm ent   size and  t he  hi gher  i s GNP  per  capit a
i ncom e,   t hen  I   have  l ess r ent- seeking  i n  t he  econom y.
The  size of  governm ent   and  r ent- seeking  r elati on  has  been expl ored by  Tul l ock  ( 1965),
Do wn s   ( 1967)  and  Ni skanen ( 1971).     I n t he ma i nst r eam  publ i c choi ce l i t erature,  wh i l e25
B uchanan and Tull ock (1962) advanced t he centr al idea that  str ong i nt erest groups
det ermi ne t he si ze of t he governm ent ,  Ni skanen (1971) has argued t hat  t he
bureaucracy contr i but ed to t he si ze of governm ent  wi t h oversuppl y hypot hesi s.
I ndeed,  I   can com bine t hese t wo   approaches by claimi ng t hat   bot h i nt erest  groups and
bureaucracy determi ne and cont r i but e to t he si ze of governm ent  t oget her
simu l t aneously.   W hen rent- seeking cost s ari se fr om  pol i t i co-econom i c m odel s based
on t he si ze and the grow t h of governm ent ,  I can em ploy t he si ze of governm ent
vari able as expl anatory vari ables t o expl ain r ent- seeking acti vi t i es.    I t   i s t r ue t hat   bot h
“bureaucracy grow t h and r ent- seeking r efl ect  governm ent   f ail ure;  wh i l e bureaucrats as
agent provocat eurs m ay induce rent- seeking pol i t i cians aw are of t hei r  r e-electi on
const r aint ” ( Mc Nu t t ,  1996: 136).   T herefore, I expect a posi t i ve relati onshi p bet w een
r ent- seeking  m easure LnR t  and  governm ent   size LnG Yt.
On   t he  ot her  hand,   t he  hi gher  t he  per  capit a i ncom e  t he  l ow er  t he  em phasi s on  t he  need
f or  governm ent   t r ansfers.    Si mp l y  at  hi gher  i ncom e  l evels,  t he  ma r gi n  of  i nt erest  group
com peti t i on  i s l i kel y  t o  be  exercised i n  t he  ma r ket   pl ace.    Ho we v e r ,   wh e n   t he  i ncom e  i s
l ow ,   pol i t i cal  all ocati on yi elds hi gher  i ncom e benefi t s t hrough t r ansfers r elati ve t o t he
i ncom e deri ved fr om  t he m arket .   In ot her wo r ds,  it  is m ore profi t able for int erest
groups t o i nvest  thei r  scarce resources to i nfl uence governm ent  pol i cy than i t  is for
t hem  t o i nvest  thei r  scarce resources in t he m arket  wh e r e the returns are low .   T he
com peti t i on  t o  cont r ol   t he  i nst r um ent s of  w ealt h  t r ansfers i s t herefore l i kel y  t o  be  mo r e
vi gorous  i n  l ow   i ncom e  count r i es t han  i n  hi gh  i ncom e  count r i es.    I n  sum ,  t he  l ow er  t he
per  capit a i ncom e ( GNPC)   t he hi gher  t he pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y and t he l ow er  degree of
pol i t i cal com peti t i on because the rul i ng coali t i on al w ays seeks to m onopol i se the
suppl y of legislati on and t o di ssipat e it s tr ansfers to t h e  me mb e r s of the support i ng
coali t i on.   I therefore expect a negat i ve relati onshi p bet w een the l evel of per capit a
i ncom e  and  r ent- seeking.     I n  order  t o  capture t hi s r elati onshi p  I   set  t wo   m odel s.    I n  t he
f i r st  m odel   I   exclude  d u mmy   vari ables eff ects and  i n  t he  second  I   add  d u mmi es.
Mo d e l   1
LnR LnGNPC LnGY D tt t t =+ + + + ab j c e 71 (12. )26
Mo d e l   2
LnR LnGNPC LnGY D D D tt t t =+ + + + + + ab j c d l e 71 74 80 (13. )
He r e,  I   t ook  t he  nat ural  l og  of  t he  vari ables since t hi s l i near  f orm  can also gi ve  us  som e
i nforma t i on  about   elasti cit y.
I n  wh e r e;
LnRt :T h e   l ogari t hm   of  r ent- seeking  ( 1960-1994  i n  curr ent  pri ces,  f r om   I MF  
r esources)
LnGNPCt:T h e   l ogari t hm   of  GNP  per  capit a ( 1960-1994  i n  curr ent  pri ces,  f r om  
I MF   r esources)
LnGYt:T h e   l ogari t hm   of  governm ent   size ( G/ GNP)   ( 1960-1994),   f r om   I MF  
r esources)
D7 1 : d u mmy   f or  1971  mi l i t ary  i nt ervent i on
D7 4 : d u mmy   f or  Cyprus  confl i ct  i n  1974
D8 0 : d u mmy   f or  1980  mi l i t ary  i nt ervent i on27
TABLE  6T h e   ADF  Te s t   f or  Integrati on  Le ve l
Levels1 s t   Di f f erences
Var i abl es.  ADF CV ADF CV I nt eger
Levels
LnRt - 0. 60 -2. 95 -7. 32 -2. 95 I( 1)
LnGNPCt - 0. 06 -2. 95 -6. 67 -2. 95 I( 1)
LnGYt - 0. 54 -3. 55 -6. 68 -3. 56 I( 1)
The  r esult s i n TABLE  6 suggest     t hat   all   t he vari ables appear  t o be stati onary i n t hei r
f i r st di f f erences.  O n the basi s of thi s informa t i on,  I can now  esti ma t e the Engl e-
Gr angercoi nt egrati on  t est  f i r st  stage esti ma t i on.
4. 2. 1. The Engl e-G ranger  Fi rst  St age  ( Long  Run)  Es t i ma t i on  f or  Turkey,  1960-1994
I n t hi s secti on I esti ma t ed tw o M odel s in order t o fi nd out  l ong-r un relati onshi p
bet w een vari ables.    TABLE  7  presents t hese  r esult s.28
TABLE  7. Dependent   Va r i abl e i s LnR t
Regress M odel   1 M odel   2
A- 1. 60
( - 2. 50)
- 0. 76
( - 1. 86)
LnGNPCt - 0. 29
( - 1. 00)
- 0. 47





D7 1 - - - - - - - - - -1 . 95
( 2. 91)
D7 4 - - - - - - - - - -1 . 21
( 1. 72)
D8 0 - - - - - - - - - -1 . 21
( 1. 74)
R
2 0. 91 0. 94
R
2 0. 90 0. 93
DW 1 . 43 1. 72
F- St at i sti c 162. 83 92. 08
SC 1. 68 0. 04
FF 2. 97 2. 19
N1 . 01 0. 27
H0 . 00 0. 16
ADF - 4. 48 -5. 59
ADF CV  5% -4. 00 -4. 00
The  val ues  i n  parentheses are t - val ues
Si nce calculated ADF  val ues  are mo r e negat i ve  t han  t he  cri t i cal  val ues  I   can now   claim
t hat  a coint egrati ng relati onshi p exi sts betw een vari ables.  W ha t  I  m ean w it h
coint egrated relati onshi p bet w een m y vari ables is that  there is a long-r un relati onshi p
bet w een budget ary rent- seeking (LnRt)  and G N P per capit a (LnG N PC t)  and
G overnm ent   Si ze (LnG Yt) .29
No w  I   proceed t o i t s second stage of  t he Engl e-Gr anger  esti ma t i on,   i . e.  I   esti ma t e an
ECM   m odel .
4. 2. 2. E rror C orrecti on  M echani sm  ( ECM )   f or  Turkey
A ccordi ng t o Engl e G ranger (1987),  if  there is a coint egrati ng relati onshi p bet w een
vari ables, there is a long-r un relati onshi p bet w een them .   Furt hermo r e, the short - r un
dynam i cs can be  descri bed  by  t he  err or  corr ecti on  m odel   ( ECM ) .     Thi s i s know n  as t he
Gr anger  r epresentati on  t heorem .
I f :
xIyI E C Ty xI x y tt t t ~( ) ,~ ( ) ,( ) , 11 0   and  Er r or  Cor r ecti on  Ter m,   i s   t hen   and  =− b
are said  t o  be  coint egrated (M addal a,  1992: 597).     The  Gr anger  r epresentati on  t heorem
i mp l i es t hat   under  t hese cir cum stances xt and yt ma y   be considered t o be generated
by  ECM   of  t he  f orm:
∆∆ yE C T x tt t t =+ + + − ab d e 1 ( 14. )
wh e r e b is nonzero and et i s w hit e-noi se err ors.  A ft er I found out  that  my  s e t  of
vari ables are coint egrated,  t hen I   can appl y err or- corr ecti on m odel l i ng t o descri be t he
short  run dynam i cs. Engl e and G ranger argue t hat  a simp l e w ay to est i ma t e Err or
Cor r ecti on M echanism  (ECM )  for the dependent  vari able and to t est the st ati sti cal
signi f i cance of  t he err or- corr ecti on t erm  i s t o use a t r adit i onal   t - t est.     A  negat i ve sign
and a si gni f i cant val ue for b (b <1) show s t hat  adjust me n t  i s m ade tow ards
r estori ng t he l ong-r un relati onshi p.   B elow  I present tw o equat i ons for M odel  1 and
M odel  2 i n order t o est i ma t e w hether short  r un adj ust me n t s are gui ded by and
consi stent wi t h t he l ong-r un equi l i bri um  or not  f or t he case of r ent- seeking,
governm ent   size and  i ncom e  per  capit a.    These m odel s are as f ol l ow s:30
Mo d e l   1
∆∆ ∆ LnRt ECT t LnGNPCt LnGYt t =+ − ++ + ab d j e 111 1 11 1 ( 15)
Mo d e l   2
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆
LnRt ECT t LnGNPCt LnGYt DD
D t
=+ − ++ + +
++
ab d f s y
qe
222 1 22 2 71 2 74
2 80 2
( 16)
The  ECM   r esult s can be  seen f r om   TABLE  8. :
TABLE  8E C M   ( Er r or  Cor r ecti on  M echanism )  f or    Mo d e l   1
D ependent   Var i abl e i s ∆LnRt
34  observati ons  used  f or  esti ma t i on  f rom  1961  t o  1990
Regr es s Coef f i cient Standard  E rror T-Rat i o[Prob. ]
A0 . 07 0. 15 0. 50    [ 0. 62]
ECM ( - 1) -0. 80 0. 20 -4. 02  [ 0. 00]
∆LnGNPC - 1. 16 0. 77 -1. 50    [ 0. 14]
∆LnGY 0. 28 0. 32 0. 87    [ 0. 40]
R
2  =  0. 35 R
2  =0. 29                                      DW =  1. 71                    F  - St ati sti c =  5. 60[0. 00]
Di agnost i c Test s
Test   St at i sti cL M   V ersion
Ser i al  Cor r elati on 3. 92
Funct i onal   For m1 . 32
No r ma l i t y0 . 76
He t eroscedasti cit y0 . 0831
TABLE 9 ECM   ( Er r or  Cor r ecti on  M echanism )  f or  Mo d e l   2
D ependent   Var i abl e i s ∆LnRt
33  observati ons  used  f or  esti ma t i on  f rom  1962  t o  1994
Regr es s Coef f i cient Standard  E rror T-Rat i o[Prob. ]
A0 . 14 0. 16 0. 90[0. 37]
ECM ( - 1) -0. 91 0. 21 -4. 25[0. 00]
∆LnGNPC - 1. 02 0. 66 -1. 55[0. 13]
∆LnGY 0. 46 0. 33 1. 39[0. 17]
∆ D7 1 1. 34 0. 44 3. 06[0. 00]
∆ D8 0 0. 74 0. 42 1. 79[0. 09]
∆ D7 4 1. 52 0. 41 3. 68[0. 00]
R
2  =0. 59 R
2  =0. 50                                DW =  1. 61                                      F  - St ati sti c =  6. 57[0. 00]
Di agnost i c Test s
Test   St at i sti cL M   V ersion
Ser i al  Cor r elati on 4. 77
Funct i onal   For m0 . 69
No r ma l i t y0 . 67
He t eroscedasti cit y0 . 65
I n  bot h  m odel s,  t he  coeff i cients on  t he  ECM s   are negat i ve  and  signi f i cant.     Thi s m eans
t hat  adjust me n t  is m ade tow ards t he l ong-r un relati onshi p.   In M odel  1,  the ECM
coeff i cient is -0. 80 and i n M odel  2,  it  is -0. 91 by suggest i ng very rapid adj ust me n t s.
Short - r un adj ust me n t s are therefore gui ded by,  and consi stent wi t h t he l ong-r un
equi l i bri um   r elati onshi p  bet w een vari ables f or  bot h  m odel s.    Ho we v e r ,   i n  bot h  M odel   1
and M odel  2 apart  fr om  dum m y vari ables, ∆LnGNPC and ∆LnGY  I r e found t o be
stati sti call y  i nsi gni f i cant  at  5%   and  10%   percent  l evels.
5. C oncl usi on
I n t hi s paper,  I have anal ysed rent- seeking w ast e ari sing for governm ent  budget ary
all ocati ons,  fol l ow i ng a m et hod suggest ed by K at z and Rosenberg.   I also exam ined32
Tur key i n t i me  s e r i es fr am ew ork i n order to understand devel opi ng count r i es rent-
seeking  str uct ure mu c h   bet t er.
Fi r st  of  all ,   I   w oul d l i ke t o em phasi se t hat   my   f i ndi ngs support   Ka t z and Rosenberg’s
r esult .   H ence, t hei r  di sti nct i on bet w een devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es sti l l
exists.  Wh i l st  governm ent s i n bot h devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es sti mu l ate r ent-
seeking,   and  t r ansfer  r esources f r om   society  t o  f ew  pri vi l eged groups  ( i nt erest  groups),
r ent- seeking  i n  devel opi ng  count r i es i s mu c h   grater  t han  i n  devel oped  count r i es.
Secondl y,  in m y addi t i onal  wo r k for Tur key,  I found t hat  there is a coint egrati ng
r elati onshi p  bet w een r ent- seeking  as a percentage of  t he  budget  LnRt  and  governm ent
size (LnG Yt) ,   and GNP  per  capit a i ncom e (LnGNPCt)   i n M odel   1.     I   also f ound t hat
t here i s a coint egrated r elati onshi p  bet w een r ent- seeking as a percentage of  t he budget
LnRt and governm ent  size (LnG Yt) ,  and G N P per capit a incom e (LnG NPC t)  and
t hree dum m y vari ables, wh i ch are D 71 (f or mi l i t ary i nt ervent i on),  D 74 (f or Cyprus
confl i ct)  and D 80 (f or mi l i t ary i nt ervent i on) i n M odel  2.   A m ong t hem  I selected
M odel   2.     I n ot her  wo r ds i ndependent   vari ables hel p t o expl ain r ent- seeking wa s t e i n
Tur key  duri ng  t he  peri od  1960-1994.     I n  addi t i on  t o  t hese  coint egrated r elati onshi ps,   I
shoul d t hat   adjust me n t s are ma d e   t ow ards r estori ng t he l ong r un r elati onshi p bet w een
r ent- seeking  and  ot her  vari ables.    Ho we v e r ,   i n  M odel   2,     t wo   mi l i t ary  i nt ervent i ons  and
t he Cyprus confl i ct  i n 1974 had mo r e pow er  t o expl ain r ent- seeking behavi our  i n t he
l ong run t han M odel  1.   T his also support s m y argum ent  that  som e int erest groups
such as t he mi l i t ary and t he bureaucracy i n Tur key,   have very di sti nct i ve pow er  upon
governm ent s i n  order  t o  extort   r esources f or  t hem sel ves.33
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